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Abstract 
In the context of post 9/11, Muslim migrant men in the Europe come under 
scrutiny where their masculinity is perceived as problematic. They are seen as 
patriarchal, traditional and conservative within their family, and as potential 
political/terrorist threat for the society. With this context in mind, this research 
wishes to understand how Bangladeshi migrant men in The Hague, 
Netherlands, experience process of marginalisation resulting from the post 
9/11 perceptions. I have argued that the process of marginalisation for 
Bangladeshi migrant men in The Hague is embedded in the intersection of 
gender, race, colour, class, religion and ethnicity. However, these intersections 
are uneven, complex and dynamic. Power relations and identities that give 
them advantage is one context, make them vulnerable in another context. 
Their darker skin colour and South Asian facial features, for example, save 
them from direct Islamophobia. Their low-class position protects them from 
direct competition with white Dutch men. However, once their religious 
affiliations are disclosed, they are shunned by Dutch neighbours, and their 
socio-economic position brings them in competition with other migrants.    
I have focused on three social spheres – the workplace, the family and the 
wider Dutch society – to understand positionality of Bangladeshi migrant men 
in relation to other migrant communities as well as white Dutch men. The 
results of my research show an ambiguous and complex scenario where 
Bangladeshi migrant men take part in some racist discourses of Dutch society 
while rejecting others, create negative stereotypes of other migrant 
communities while claiming some similarities with them, question family 
dedication of other Muslim communities while going to their mosque. 
Furthermore, Bangladeshi migrant men negotiate their marginalised 
masculinity by stressing their breadwinner role, good manners and family 
dedication, and judge themselves better family men than other migrant and 
white Dutch men.  
At the same time, Bangladeshi migrant men live in a ‘Bangladesh bubble’ 
where their life is organised around links and relationships with people from 
Bangladesh, and with other Bangladeshi migrants. While this means a 
(self)isolation from Dutch society, this bubble allows them to ignore 
hegemonic notions and practices of white Dutch masculinity in Netherlands, 
and creates their own ideals of masculinity. Ultimately, they stood out as ideal 
men, better than white Dutch and other migrants.  
This showed us that the process of marginalisation is context specific. 
Men from different position face and negotiate marginalisation differently. 
Keywords 
Bangladeshi migrant men, masculinity, Islamophobia, colonial racial 
discourse, intersectionality, other migrant communities, white Dutch.
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Ambiguous positionalities 1 
Bangladeshi migrant men in The Hague 
 
1 Introduction: Contextualising Bangladeshi migrants in The 
Hague 
1.1  Contextual background 
In any social order, there are differences and similarities among men in terms 
of masculinity, sexuality, class, ethnicity, religion, citizenship and many other 
social relations of power. However, in the current context in Europe, not all of 
these differences have the same relevance. Post 9/11 discourses seem to have 
bundled up many of those differences in a single package where all Muslim 
migrant men, regardless of their ethnic, religious and class background, are 
perceived as problematic. Their masculinity is thought to be problematic not 
only for their family – where they are seen as patriarchal, traditional, 
conservative but also for the whole society – where they are seen as potential 
political/terrorist threat.  
In The Hague, Dutch administrative capital, differences between ethnic 
Dutch citizens and migrants (allochtonen: persons who have at least one parent 
who was born outside the Netherlands), and the differences between western 
and non-western allochtonen shape the way masculinity is understood. Because 
of colonial legacies and racist notions and practices of racialized superiority, 
white and ethnic Dutch men are perceived superior to Muslim migrant men 
(Bracke 2012: 245). In post 9/11 context, these Muslim men are targeted on 
the basis of their cultural and religious practice. They are thought to be morally 
inferior and oppress their women by imposing special dress code (e.g. 
headscarf, veil) and bound them to work within the home. Much research (e.g. 
Bracke 2012, Clycq 2012, Yilmaz 2015, Abu-Lughod 2002 etc.) however show 
that these are far from true and this type of stereotyping is actually used to 
marginalise masculinity of those men.  
One of the important aspects of this representation is stereotyping and 
generalisation. In this process, differences between Muslims and between 
migrant communities are often overlooked. However, I start from an 
assumption that such stereotyping does not always work in the same way, and 
while Islam marks migrant communities, other social relations of power such 
1 I am thankful to my supervisor, Dr. Dubravka Zarkov, without whom this research 
could not be possible. She helped me every stage of my research, from initial 
conceptualization to final analysing outcome - I have learned a lot from her. I am also 
thankful to my second reader, Dr. Rosalba Icaza Garza, for her useful comments and 
criticism, which helped me aware about my research process. I would also like to 
thank my respondents- Mirza, Zaman, Rima, Mahfuz, Shova, Rohmat, Iqbal, Atiqur, 
Newaz, Shafiq (pseudo names). Last but not the least, I am thankful to my wife – 
without her help and inspiration, this research may never see the light. 
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as race, gender, religion and class may work differently for different groups of 
Muslim migrant men. Therefore, understanding differences between Muslim 
migrants can be useful to deconstruct dominant discourses about them. 
Equally important is to understand how migrant men of Muslim background 
themselves perceive Dutch society and their position within it, especially in the 
post 9/11 context.  
For that purpose, this research will concentrate on Bangladeshi diaspora 
community in The Hague and focus on their experiences of marginalisation in 
terms of religion, ethnicity, race and class. I will explore how the post 9/11 
social and political context in the Netherlands has created the specific social 
construction of Bangladeshi community and especially of Bangladeshi-
allochtonen men. My analytical perspective will be informed by intersections of 
race, colour, class, gender, religion and ethnicity, in order to understand 
whether Bangladeshi-allochtonen men are faced with the same social 
constructions as other Muslim migrants living in The Hague, Netherlands. 
Furthermore, I will try to understand how Bangladeshi-allochtonen men 
negotiate their position in Dutch society in their daily life. I would like to 
explore how these men perceive, change or challenge marginalised identity in 
their daily life in relation with white Dutch and other migrant Muslim men.     
1.2  Research questions and objectives 
In order to understand social location and experiences of Bangladeshi men in 
The Hague, this research will try to give answer the following question:  
 How gender, race, colour, class and religion/Islam are implicated in social 
location and experiences of manhood among Bangladeshi migrants in The 
Hague, Netherlands? 
 
To answer this question, I need to understand the current social and 
political context in the Netherlands and how this context is implicated in 
Bangladeshi allochtonen men’s social location. By social location, I mean the 
material and discursive circumstances that feminists theorising standpoint 
epistemology have addressed2. In this aspect, person’s social location is not 
static but fragmented and always changing and partial. A person who is 
privileged in the race can be marginalised for his ethnic or religious position 
and people from the different class of that marginalised group have 
experienced their social location differently. Those circumstances address not 
only their multiple identities regarding gender, race, colour and class, but also 
the specific context of social relations of power within Dutch society that mark 
2 Feminist standpoint theorists argued that knowledge is socially situated and social 
location and identities like race, class, ethnicity and gender influence what can be 
known from reality. However, these identities are not fixed; it can be changed. So 
social location can be changed. For details see: Harding, S. (1993) ‘Rethinking 
Standpoint Epistemology: What is Strong Objectivity?’ in L. Alcoff and E. Potter 
(eds) Feminist Epistemologies, pp. 49-82. 
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their oppression and marginalisation, and special social histories of the 
Netherlands through which those are produced.  
Therefore, in order to answer my main research question, I pose three 
sub-questions. First two address the context needed to understand the position 
of Bangladeshi migrant men in the Netherlands, the third addresses their 
strategies dealing with those conditions.  
 
1. What is the specific post 9/11 socio-political context in the Netherlands that is 
implicated in the social location for Muslim, migrant men?  
In the aftermath of 9/11, Muslims are perceived as problematic and 
dangerous in the dominant social representation in the Netherlands. In this 
process, the masculinity of Muslim men comes under scrutiny. Their form of 
masculinity thought to as problematic for their own family as well as for the 
Dutch society as a whole, and they become a target not only of the right-wing 
anti-immigrant party but also of some liberal feminists and mainstream 
academics and politicians. Right wing party accuses them for ‘destroying’ so-
called Dutch norms and values; Liberal feminists, on the other hand, accuse 
them for not giving equal opportunity and liberty to their wives and daughters. 
This type of stereotyping actually works to stereotype, generalise and 
marginalise Muslim communities and creates difference between white Dutch 
‘us’ and immigrant, Muslim ‘them’. However, while this stereotyping is a 
widespread general process, some differences seem to exist in how specific 
groups of migrants are perceived. Race and colour seem to make important 
difference, distinguishing between Middle Eastern and South Asian migrants. 
In this research, I want to explore these specific processes of generalisation as 
well as differentiation, and to understand how they position different migrant 
groups within Dutch society.   
 
2. How this context impacts Bangladeshi community, especially Bangladeshi allochtonen 
men’s social location vis-à-vis other migrants in Dutch society? 
Discourses about migrant Muslim men also affect the location and 
perception of Bangladeshi men in The Hague, Netherlands. The situation of 
Bangladeshi men seems to be different from Muslim migrant men from the 
Middle East in the Netherlands. Bangladeshi population has darker skin colour 
than Turkish or Moroccan, so the intersection of gender/masculinity, 
migration and race and colour is important to analyse. In addition, their 
number is very small and most of them work in lower paid jobs, and thus 
belong to lower social-economic strata of Dutch society. I will explore how all 
these differences impact on the dominant Dutch discourses on migrant 
Bangladeshi Muslim men in The Hague. Furthermore, I also want to know 
how are these discourses different comparing with other migrant Muslim 
communities. 
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3. What are the experiences and life strategies of Bangladeshi men in dealing with their 
marginalised social position, and how they address it within their family, in the Bangla-
deshi community, in relation to other Muslim migrants and in relation to white Dutch 
men?  
It is very important to understand that individual is not always the victim 
or object of dominant social representation; individual also has the ability to 
challenge and change that representation by his/her strategy, negotiation, and 
action. In the context where manhood becomes marginalised, Bangladeshi men 
have to negotiate their positions in their family and in their community, as well 
as in Dutch society. In this research, I will try to examine how Bangladeshi 
men deal with their marginalised position especially paying attention to the 
intersection of multiple marginalisations and gender relations of power, i.e. 
masculinity of the migrant Bangladeshi men.  
1.3  Original contribution and justification of the study 
This research offers two innovative aspects in studying Bangladeshi migrant 
men in the Netherlands.  First, I choose to work on Bangladeshi men and their 
experiences of marginalisation and perceptions of masculinity, which is rarely 
studied in academia. Secondly, I took the intersectional approach to analyse 
how class, gender, race, religion, and ethnicity shape the lives of Dutch 
Bangladeshi migrant men.  
This research starts from the assumption that the situation of Bangladeshi 
allochtonen is different from other Muslim communities in the Netherlands and 
especially Turkish or Moroccan. Bangladeshi community is small in numbers. 
Their physical appearance, dress and food habit are different from what Dutch 
society perceives as Muslim. Class is important here too, as Bangladeshi men 
work in relatively low paid jobs. Most of the Bangladeshi men in the 
Netherlands work in the restaurants or the food shops. Their competition in 
labour market is more with the other non-western allochtonen than with the 
Dutch or Western allochtonen. For that reason, they seem not to pose a threat to 
the white Dutch who are more concentrated in the higher paid jobs. Their 
dress code is also different from what is perceived as Islamic dress code as few 
Bangladeshi women wear headscarf. Their physical outlook is closer to South 
Asian than to Middle Eastern (which is a dominant perception about Muslims) 
communities.  
I suggest that these differences have an important effect on the social 
location and construction of Bangladeshi men and women as migrants in the 
Netherlands. The process, which marginalises Turkish or Moroccan men, 
works differently for Bangladeshi men. Here, it seems, the main reference of 
manhood for Bangladeshi men is not ethnic Dutch men, but rather other 
Muslim migrant communities. Thus, processes of othering and marginalisation 
work differently for the Bangladeshi men. This means that hierarchies also 
work within migrant communities, between not only migrants and dominant 
nationals. Bangladeshi men can be marginalised compared to Turkish or 
Moroccan  because  they  have  darker  skin  and  work  in lower paid jobs than 
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they, while Turkish and Moroccan men have been primarily marginalised 
because  of  Islamophobic  and  racists  understanding of  religion and  ‘Islamic 
culture’. In this regard, this research has the potentiality to enrich the 
discussion of Islamophobia as well as the critical understanding of the process 
of marginalisation. 
1.4  Methodological journey 
Feminist intersectional theory: Adjusting my lens 
Kimberlé Crenshaw introduced feminist intersection theory, which she 
explained as a tool, which can be used to understand the reality of 
marginalisation through different axis of power, such as race, class, gender, 
sexual orientation etc. (Crenshaw 1997: 178). Her idea helps us to shift away 
from an additive model, which focuses on independent identities and 
emphasises overlapping and intersection of identities (Choo and Ferree 2010, 
Shields 2008; as cited in Hillsburg 2013: 3). However, translating those ideas 
into methodology is not simple as there is no single standard methodology for 
intersectional research. Challenge for the researcher is, as Hillsburg (2013: 4) 
noted, not only to find a methodology which will explore various marginal 
identity indicators but also go deeper into the fluidity of those markers.  
I used unstructured qualitative interview method while talking with my 
informants in different places at a number of times about their life in the 
Netherlands. My ethnic identity – being a Bangladeshi man - and the shared 
language helped to create a relaxed atmosphere. Having repeated interview-
conversation with the same respondent was beneficial as it helped me to go 
deeper to understand the complex process of marginalisation. My starting 
assumption was that Bangladeshi migrants would face discrimination because 
of Islamophobia. Yet, I found that most of my respondents said very little 
about their marginalisation at the first meeting.  It was frustrating for me 
because I met most of my respondents long before the interviews started and I 
thought that I gained enough trust. However, this frustration taught me two 
things. First, about my positionality as a researcher. Even though I am a 
Bangladeshi, my educational status along with my temporary residence in the 
Netherlands created barriers. For Bangladeshi migrants, positionality is linked 
with both the Netherlands and Bangladesh, as they possess higher status in 
Bangladesh because of their European residency. Therefore, they were 
sceptical to showing their marginal situation to a Bangladeshi man. Secondly, 
after two-three meetings, I realised that marginalisation is not static and not all 
people experienced it equally. So for intersectional research, one marker of 
marginalisation is not static or the same all the time; it can change, mix with 
other marker or used as a marker of superiority. The same markers, which 
create problem for him/her in some places, can help him/her in other places. 
These adjustments help me to focus on dynamics and flexibility of Bangladeshi 
migrant men’s positionality in Dutch society.  
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Data collection and limitations of the study 
I have conducted qualitative interview with ten respondents. In most cases, I 
conducted those interviews in three meetings, sometimes at the respondent's 
home, sometimes in their workplace.  
I met with many interviewees long before the interview took place. My 
Bangladeshi nationality helped me to meet with them on various social 
occasions. In addition, their homes and restaurants in which some of them 
work were also places where I met other migrants and was able to interest 
them in my research and obtain an interview.  
My respondents are first generation migrants, both male and female. 
Connell (1995) showed the importance of understanding and acceptance of 
male role and hegemonic aspects of masculinity among both men and women. 
Most of my respondents either are restaurant workers or worked in a 
restaurant previously. However, one of my respondents was a University 
teacher, which allowed me to compare class dynamic within Bangladeshi 
migrants. Profile of my respondent is in Appendix 1.  
Bearing in mind the small number of interviewees, the results of this 
research cannot be generalised to all Bangladeshi migrant men in The Hague. 
While this can be seen as a limitation, I hope it also offers a good starting point 
for the understanding of complexities of processes and dynamics of exclusion 
in migrants’ lives and thus can inspire further research.  At the same time, these 
results cannot be seen as valid for migrants from different backgrounds, as 
literatures show that men from the Middle East living in Europe face different 
challenges.  
1.5  Structure of the paper 
Beside this introductory chapter, this study has five more chapters.  In chapter 
two, I discuss theoretical issues that inspired this research. There, I address 
intersectional approach as well as the concepts of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ and 
‘coloniality of power and gender’ to show their relevance for understanding the 
situation of Bangladeshi migrant men in The Hague. In the subsequent three 
chapters, I analyse positionality of Bangladeshi migrant men in three different 
but interconnected spheres: workplace, family and broader Dutch society. In 
the penultimate chapter, I review my overall discussion and draw relevant 
conclusions. 
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2 Theorising Bangladeshi migrant men’s masculinity 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will discuss the theoretical issues, which shape my 
understanding to analyse the situation of Bangladeshi migrant men in The 
Hague. For that purpose, first, I will discuss Connell’s (1995) concept of 
‘hegemonic masculinity’ and show some limitations of his initial 
conceptualization, which restricts to see complexities between and within 
gender relations. I will argue that his later reformulation will be more helpful to 
understand the positionality of Bangladeshi migrant men. In relation with that, 
I will then discuss intersectional approach used by feminist of colour, which 
will help me to understand the dynamics of race, ethnicity, religion and class 
intersection where Bangladeshi migrant men situate. After that, I will bring the 
Quijano’s concept of ‘coloniality of power’ and Lugones’s concept of 
‘coloniality of gender’ to understand how those intersectional axes shaped by 
the colonial discourse. In the final section, I will contextualise the situation of 
the Netherlands in relation to my work. 
2.2  Hegemonic masculinity and the experiences of migrant 
men 
In recent migrant studies, the idea of hegemonic masculinity has become 
important for the understanding of migrant men’s life experiences. Connell 
(1998: 5) defines hegemonic masculinity as a set of ideas and practices that are 
perceived as ideal for all men. Those ideals and practices are marked, first, by a 
belief of male superiority and dominance in relation to women, and second, by 
absolute privileging of heteronormativity that structures relations between men 
and women, as well as among men. Needless to say, very few men are able to 
achieve those ideals. Connell’s discussion is important here as it showed 
variation among men and illustrated that not all men (equally) enjoy the 
dividend from patriarchal social norms. Migrant men, for example, may have a 
very limited possibility to exert any kind of dominance towards both women 
and men of the host society, even when they hold power over women in their 
own family or community. However, Connell’s initial conceptualization of 
hegemonic masculinity faced strong criticism from the various academic 
corner.  
At the heart of Connell’s argument is the Gramscian concept of 
‘hegemony’, which enables him to see the power relationship between and 
within gender. Gramsci showed that it is ideological formation, not material 
reality, which establishes “fusion of the objectives of various social groups to 
run under the leadership of one social group” (Dudink 2004: 9). Although 
various elements that form hegemony are not necessarily based on class, but it 
is dominant class that organises such hegemony. Similarly, Connell uses the 
concept of hegemonic masculinity to argue that power relation between and 
within gender is related to the various spectrum like race, class, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation etc. embedded in the process of marginalisation and domination. 
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Similar with Gramsci, he too argues that it is one group (dominant men) that 
benefited from it (ibid). The attraction of this conceptualization is that it 
enables us to look at gendered power relation in the intersection with race, 
class, religion and ethnicity to understand the difference between men. 
However, Connell seems to limit this opportunity by stating that all these 
factors, in the end, reproduce male dominance and legitimise patriarchal social 
norms. This creates a problem for understanding multiplicity and flexibility of 
those axes. The difference between men then become merely an outcome of 
patriarchal social norms, not as an important reality, which we can focus on 
and explore. 
Connell’s perception of hegemonic masculinity presumes that some 
features and practices of men become hegemonic because they ensure men 
dominance over women. Other masculinities, as Demetriou (2001: 344) 
argued, are subordinated not because they are naturally inferior but because 
they are inconsequential to the practice of dominance over women. So, the 
plurality of masculinities in not an end of his argument, but rather an 
instrument to show the complexity of gender discrimination (ibid). He draws a 
simple relationship between hegemonic and marginalised masculinity where all 
men try to achieve whatever hegemonic masculine idea exist in that time and 
some get benefit from it while others are marginalised. Later studies, however, 
showed that the process is far more complex than Connell thought. Demetriou 
(2001) for example showed that hegemonic masculinity does not become 
hegemonic by creating distance between heterosexual and homosexual 
practice, rather it becomes more legitimised by incorporating some aspects 
from homosexuality. He gives examples of recent films and practices of gay 
culture and various advertisements to show that ideal men nowadays are not 
like a Sylvester Stallone ‘Rambo’ type but rather a person who have the quality 
of both softness and hardness (Demetriou 2001: 354). Although he explained 
that these outcomes did not liberate gay person, but his arguments show us 
how hegemonic masculinity operates by taking some aspects of marginalised 
masculinity.  
Heteronormativity is one of the pillars of Connell’s hegemonic 
masculinity. In this understanding, homosexuality becomes marginalised 
because it not only creates problem for the perception of ideal men but also 
fails to make distinction from the perception of idealised femininity 
(Demetriou 2001: 344). However, this generalised idea of homosexuality limits 
us to understand homosexual practice as always marginalised and in opposition 
to hegemonic masculinity. In contrary, Sarrah Bracke (2012) shown that 
homosexuality can become a part of hegemonic masculinity which can be used 
to marginalised Muslim men. She argues that politics of ‘saving women’ has 
now changed into the politics of ‘saving gays’ in the Netherlands. For her, this 
is a paradoxical scenario, because in colonial period Arab men were 
characterised as having problematic sexual orientation, as homosexuals, and 
rejected as deviant for that.  However, today, in Europe, Arab men are 
stereotyped as homophobic. On the other side of the coin, Dutch norms of 
gender equality and gay rights are idealised as widely and universally accepted 
by all white Dutch citizens. Within these new stereotypes, gay men in Muslim 
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communities (in the Netherlands and abroad) are defined as being in danger 
because of Islamic norms, and thus need to be saved. This is then coupled with 
the ‘saving Muslim women’ politics and general approach to ‘civilise’ Muslims 
in the Netherlands. Where in colonial period ‘civilised people’ were 
characterised as those who practice heterosexuality, now ‘civilised’ are those 
who uphold gay rights. This scenario did not prove that gay men now become 
dominant in the Netherlands, but it shows how those perceptions of 
homosexuality can become, in some cases, a dominant one and marginalise 
other masculinities. 
Donaldson (1993) also criticises the concept of hegemonic masculinity by 
giving example of the new care and household work by men. For him, if 
gender is understood by what person does rather than what s/he is perceived 
to be, then men who work in the household and take care of their children 
nowadays seem to challenge hegemonic masculinity (Donaldson 1993: 650). In 
hegemonic masculinity, men’s work in the household mean very little but 
Donaldson argues that men who only work outside and do not engage in non-
paid care work seem to create emotional distance from their children. Men 
who work in the home beside their breadwinner role, on the other hand, live a 
more harmonious marriage relationship (Donaldson 1993: 651). It completes 
their masculine role. So, according to Donaldson, female role does not always 
discredit men from hegemonic masculinity rather it can be incorporated and 
enrich men’s position in the family.  
Connell himself later reformulates his primary conceptualization of 
hegemonic masculinity. In his recent article together with Messerschmidt, he 
abandoned the one-dimensional approach to see the power relation of 
hegemonic masculinity in relation to various groups of men and relation to 
women’s subordination (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 847). Authors 
emphasised multiple ways power relations operate, where dominant 
masculinity can be fragmented at the local level and can also incorporate 
feminine and homosexual quality. They also stress that incorporation and 
marginalisation can work together. Some aspects of homosexuality may be 
incorporated in dominant discourses but violence against gays is still occurring 
in many places.  Furthermore, they also take race, class, ethnicity spectrum to 
understand the complexity of power relation where hegemonic masculinity 
operates. 
This understanding of hegemonic masculinity is important for this 
research. Hegemony does not operate from the top, where some dominant 
groups practice and others become marginalised, rather different local groups 
can perceive, challenge and in some case reject dominant idea and create 
something of their own. Similarly, this paper will argue that Bangladeshi 
migrant men in The Hague do not always adopt dominant perception of 
masculinity in the Netherlands. They incorporate something, reject something 
and introduce something new to create their own ideal of masculinity. 
Furthermore, their practices and understandings of masculinity are linked with 
race, class, religion and ethnicity. I will now turn to these intersections.  
14 
 
2.3  Masculinity, intersectionality, and Islam: Post 9/11 
Europe 
Intersectional approach, pioneered by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991), is an 
analytical tool to understand “gender as a multidimensional phenomenon 
where multiple axes of identity (gender, race, class, ability, age) interact on 
multiple and often simultaneous levels, creating a system of oppression that 
reflects the ‘intersection’ of multiple forms of discrimination” (as cited in 
Sinatti 2014: 218). Black feminists use this approach to understand the reality 
of women of colour. This approach can also be useful to understand the reality 
of migrant men. In their settlement process, they have to negotiate with 
various dimension of identities such as race class, ethnicity, religion, and 
gender (Hibbins and Pease 2009: 3). Some identities may become more 
important in some contexts and may help them, while others may create 
problems. Their perception and the practice of masculinity lie in the 
experiences of different dimensions of identities. However, very few researches 
have been done on that intersection in order to understand life experience of 
migrant men. Moreover, some literatures, which deal with those issues, take 
migrant communities as homogeneous assuming they all go through the same 
experiences. In relation to Muslim migrant men, some literatures make 
distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim migrants, but the differences 
among Muslim communities in terms of race, ethnicity, and class have most 
often been overlooked. 
Ferruh Yılmaz (2015) shows the relevance of both class and religion while 
discussing the new type of social formations in Europe which create 
antagonism between ‘Europeans’ and ‘Muslims’ in Denmark. According to 
him, during the last three decades, class difference became less important and 
cultural difference became a centre of attention in the group identifications in 
Denmark. In this context, public characterization of foreigners changed from a 
‘migrant worker’ of the 1960s into a ‘Muslim immigrant’ since the late 1980s 
and 1990s. In Europe, class struggle played an important role in the mid-
twentieth century. While migrant workers regularly faced discrimination in 
labour market and their contribution to the state was repeatedly ignored, they 
have still been seen as workers. But now, “immigration has been transformed 
from being a labour issue into a cultural one, and immigrants who were 
originally characterised as workers (a class category) are turned into Muslims (a 
cultural category)” (Yilmaz 2015: 38). So-called ‘Islamic norms’ are 
simultaneously seen as problematic and incompatible with European (Danish) 
values. People who fight against class struggle, xenophobes, feminists, gay 
rights organisations now all stand on a common ground to identify ‘Islamic 
norms’ and ‘Muslim migrants’ as a problem for Danish society. Differences 
between Muslims in terms of nationality, ethnicity, class etc. have become less 
important as all Muslims are characterised as practitioners of ‘bad cultural 
norms’: honour killings, forced/early marriages, headscarves, female 
circumcision, etc. For Yilmaz, this type of identification also serves to 
characterise what is meant by ‘being Danish’: i.e. to identify Danish people as 
those who do not practice those ‘bad cultural norms’, who see women as equal 
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and uphold gay rights. Yilmaz describes this type of antagonism as a 
hegemonic practice to create difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Yilmaz 2015: 
39). What is ‘us’ in this context means what the other lacks.  This type of 
othering process not only marginalises some groups of people but also 
obscures the need for discussion of class politics and the labour market 
discrimination. 
Noel Clycq (2012) brings other important issues that point to the 
relevance of context-specific intersection between different relations of power, 
within various European countries. In his research on the people of Belgian, 
Italian and Moroccan origin living in Flanders, Belgium, he shows how global 
and national discourses of othering come together. Analysing intersections 
between ethnicity, religion, and gender; when asking parents how they would 
react to the daughters’ marriage choices; he argued that those power relations 
create boundaries between the three groups. For Belgian and Italian parents, 
Moroccan sons-in-law would be perceived as problematic not only because of 
their subordination of women but also because this subordination is associated 
with Islam. Therefore, when parents were asked whether they are ok that their 
daughter marries a Moroccan man, they respond negatively and depict Islamic 
norms that would lead to subordination of their daughter. However, they do 
not see this problem when their son is dating or marrying a Moroccan woman. 
Women, in this case, are seen as someone who can and should easily transform 
or adopt new norms or culture. Clycq goes further to show how differently 
religion and ethnicity are approached. When Belgians are asked about their 
daughters having Italian partners, they depict gender discrimination in terms of 
‘being Italian’. When both partners are Belgian, male dominance and 
patriarchal attitudes are seen as individual men’s characteristics, not as national 
characteristics. However, when Belgians and Italians are asked about 
Moroccans, then patriarchy and male domination are explained by Islam. Both 
Belgians and Italians see Moroccan men as problematic in the same way, and 
religion becomes the main boundary. Clycq argues that dominant social 
representation plays a hegemonic role to shape the understanding of 
individuals as well as groups. 
Clycq’s (2012) argument is interesting because it shows the difference of 
perception in different migrant ethnic communities that I find relevant for my 
own research on Bangladeshi men in the Netherlands. This literature, however, 
does not address differences within a religious community in terms of 
ethnicity, class or race, nor differences between various Muslim communities. 
In terms of Bangladeshi migrants, those differences are important for the 
understanding of the social construction of their masculinity and negotiation 
process with that construction. Regarding negotiation, it is very interesting to 
know what happen when a man migrates. Would specific gender ideologies 
also travel with him or would the new context force the migrant man to 
reconstruct gender ideology and change his understanding of masculinity, 
femininity, heteronormativity and gender hierarchies?  Discussion of 
Silberschmidt (2001) can be useful here. She explains how socioeconomic 
changes  can  marginalise men. In her work in rural Kenya and urban Tanzania, 
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She showed how men could also be marginalised within their own 
communities if their traditional role of breadwinner is impossible to realise. 
Similarly, Haque and Kusakabe (2005: 185-208) show in the case of rural 
Bangladesh that men’s self-esteem and pride weaken when they lose their job 
or when they work in the household which is seen as a female domain. 
Discussion of Silberschmidt (2001), and Haque and Kusakabe (2005) give us 
an indication that socio-economic changes that are associated with migration 
can change the situation and perception of masculinity. For this reason, it is 
also important to understand the practices of masculinity that the migrant men 
engage in while living in Bangladesh, as well as the multiple forms of 
discrimination – following class, ethnicity or religion – experienced before 
migration. 
2.4  Coloniality of power and gender 
Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano (2000) uses the concept of ‘coloniality of 
power’ to understand how the power dynamics which dominated in colonial 
time are still operating in all forms of social hierarchies. For her, racial 
classification, which defines white European men superior to others, creates 
multiple social stratifications based on racial classification. To understand 
migrant people’s experience and discrimination in Europe means to 
understand ‘coloniality of power’, which shapes the understanding of migration 
and migrants as individuals and communities, and the structural injustices that 
shape their lives. Applying ‘coloniality of power’ in my research helps me to 
understand the social location of Dutch Bangladeshi migrants in relation to 
European and Dutch colonial history. They come to a land, which already 
holds a certain understanding of race, and racial hierarchies, which have been 
shaped by the long Dutch colonial history. Bangladesh was not colonised by 
the Netherlands, but by Britain. Nevertheless, they are affected by the legacy of 
Dutch colonialism within the Netherlands. Grosfoguel et al. (2015: 642) called 
this type of migrant group “colonial immigrants”. Through this lens, although 
Bangladeshi migrants did not experience colonial rule of the host country, they 
nevertheless are affected by Dutch imagination about “colonial/racial subject 
of empire” and experience the same racial hierarchy, which Indonesian or 
Surinamese people experienced (ibid). Their colour, physical appearance, 
clothing, attitude etc. become sources of their marginalisation because of the 
colonial power relations and social hierarchies articulated by them. For migrant 
men, this brings a double jeopardy.  On the one hand, they have to maintain 
breadwinner role, which is a prime factor to give sense to their masculinity, 
while facing discrimination in host country’s labour market because of the 
colonial heritage and the subsequent social stratifications. On the other hand, 
they, and especially Muslim men are seen as problematic since 9/11 terrorist 
attacks on the USA, and especially since the number of high profile terrorist 
attacks in Europe (such as Spanish bombing of the train station, UK 7/7, and 
more recently those in France, Belgium, and Germany).  
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Discussion of coloniality of power helps me to understand how dominant 
social representations of migrants in the Netherlands shape the way 
Bangladeshi-allochtonen men are perceived, and how they become ‘other’ in 
Dutch society. However, I also want to know how Bangladeshi men position 
themselves, and are positioned, within other Muslim migrant communities. 
The hierarchal racial discourses created in the ‘coloniality of power’ do not 
only work in the mind of dominant ethnic, religious or gender, social groups. 
Because hegemonic ideas are upheld and cherished in many social and political 
spheres, they also operate among marginal groups. So, an Indonesian or 
Surinamese man who found himself at the bottom of Dutch colonial or 
contemporary social hierarchy can become superior to a lower paid, dark-
skinned Bangladeshi man. Because of his dark skin, country origin, and socio-
economic location in relatively low-paid jobs (such as restaurant work), 
Bangladeshi men can find themselves at even lower social position than 
Turkish or Moroccan men. Thus, a nuanced way to understand how race, 
colour, class, ethnicity and religion work may be helped by the use of the 
framework of coloniality of power. 
Maria Lugones (2008) also uses the concept of ‘coloniality of power’ and 
intersectional approaches to understand gender relationship. However, she 
thinks coloniality of power leads us to naturalise gender as the biological 
difference between human populations. She argues that Quijano’s concept is 
helpful to understand how European concepts become ideal but it leaves very 
little space to understand how gender itself becomes an important social 
stratification for all human being. She gives an example of Oyéronké 
Oyewùmí’s work and shows that gender was not an organising principle in 
Yoruba society prior to European colonisation (Lugones 2008: 8). She also 
gives an example of Paula Gunn Allen who discusses about many Indian tribes 
where gender was not understood in the biological term, e.g. a woman who 
dreams as a man can act like a man next day (Lugones 2008: 10). With these 
examples, Lugones argues that we should not fall into a trap to understand 
gender in a Euro-cantered way e.g. heterosexual, male dominant, biological 
dimorphism etc. 
Lugones emphasises the inseparability of the intersection. She proposes 
the concept of ‘coloniality of gender’, which focus on various intersectional 
categories in relation to one another and are shaped by coloniality of power. In 
doing so, she also wants to deconstruct dominant discourses of gender and 
race.  Her argument is helpful to my research as it concentrates on the 
inseparability of various identities. Furthermore, the insight she gives on the 
concept of ‘coloniality of gender’ helps me to be aware of the Eurocentric 
understanding of gender. I am more interested in how Bangladeshi migrant 
men in The Hague relate their experiences with various intersectional 
identities, not only gender; and how they position themselves towards other 
migrant men, not only towards Dutch. However, I am also interested to see 
the fluidity of those intersectional identities. If we take only coloniality as the 
fundamental discourse, which shapes every social order, then we may overlook 
the flexibility of those intersectional identities. For example, I will show that 
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dark skin colour – which usually marginalises people within Europe, may bring 
other power dynamics for the Bangladeshi men in the Netherlands.  
2.5  Old and new migration in the Netherlands 
In the context of Bangladeshi migrants living in The Hague, socio-political 
contexts also have an effect on their social location of how they perceive and 
understand their masculinity. In this respect, literatures related to old and new 
migration patterns in Europe help us to understand those socio-political 
contexts. Discussion of old and new migration is also relevant to my analysis as 
it depicts the situation of recent migrants – especially those who came after 
9/11 - compared to the older generation.  
Migration in contemporary Europe has various trends. After the Second 
World War, people mostly from southern European countries migrated to 
western European countries to fill the gaps created by economic growth. After 
that, came a wave of migration in the 1970s, when global oil crisis leads to low 
paid job opportunities filled by people from Asia and Mediterranean (Reyneri 
and Fullin 2011: 32). These unskilled migrants took whatever job they got and 
did with very low wages. They helped to lower the price of commodities even 
in the oil crisis. Many of them got permanent residence and brought their 
family to Europe. The next wave of migration into Europe started in the 1980s 
and continues until now: asylum seekers, refugees and educated people (ibid). 
The Netherlands and Denmark become the prime location for asylum seekers 
as these countries’ policies initially favoured asylum seekers (Reyneri and Fullin 
2011: 41). However, migration policies of Western Europe after 9/11 
especially become tighter than ever before. Therefore, it becomes difficult for 
unskilled migrants to come into Europe. Reyneri and Fullin (2011) in their 
comparative analysis of the Netherlands, UK, Denmark, Germany, Italy and 
Spain showed that there is a trade-off between unemployment and job quality. 
In Netherlands and Denmark, quality of job for migrants is relatively better 
than in Italy and Spain but the unemployment rate of migrants compared to 
natives is much higher. The reason behind this according to their analysis is 
that manual jobs are rare in the Netherlands and Denmark. Therefore, it is very 
difficult to get a job for an unskilled worker. In my view, however, their 
analysis lacks the social and political aspect of migrant unemployment. Both 
Netherlands and Denmark increasingly become hostile towards the migrant 
community, therefore getting a job become additionally difficult for migrants. 
Various policies such as Dutch civic integration policy also create obstacles for 
employment of migrants. Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) 
reported that employers tended to hire native Dutch rather than migrants in 
the higher paid jobs (Netherlands Institute for Human Rights 2015: 5). Girls 
wearing hijab also face discrimination to get internship posts. Therefore, these 
issues play a significant role in migrant unemployment.  
Andriessen et al. (2010) also show that persons belonging to an ethnic 
minority in the Netherlands have less chance to be called for an interview than 
native Dutch, even when having similar qualifications. They found 
discrimination to be severe in the hospital and retail sectors, especially in 
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customer care section. Furthermore, they also found that men from ethnic 
minorities face more discrimination than women, as migrant men (especially 
Muslims) are perceived more negatively than women in Dutch dominant social 
representation (Andriessen et al. 2010: 95). NIHR report also showed similar 
kind of discrimination practices for the migrant communities in the 
Netherlands. Stating from a research conducted by Panteia, NIHR notes that 
“half of the Dutch population have a negative opinion of Muslims” and 61-
71% of students in the secondary level make negative comments on Muslims, 
which may come from the media representation (Netherlands Institute for 
Human Rights 2015: 10). The report also stated that state policies such as 
Action Programme on the Integral Approach to Jihadism and the Interim 
Counterterrorism have some responsibility for these (ibid). The report 
suggested that such approaches create negative stereotyping about Muslim 
community, which may create problems in the job market and other social 
areas. 
Gloria Wekker (2016) also criticised Dutch integration policy for focusing 
only on the migrant community. Her examination of Dutch policies related to 
ethnic minorities showed that these policies moved from a question of 
economic independence to cultural emancipation. She criticised those policies 
for assuming white men and women to be “race free” and culturally 
emancipated, and only ethnic minorities like Turkish and Moroccan are left to 
emancipate (Wekker 2016: 59). Wekker notes that these ideas are problematic 
in two ways. First, they hide racism, which is very much present in the 
Netherlands. Secondly, those policies try to enforce specific kind of cultural 
norms towards the migrant community, which also hides the economic 
discrimination they face. Wekker explores the paradox of Dutch society where 
tolerance and innocence in self-representation coexist with racial 
discrimination, violent colonial history, and xenophobia. Using postcolonial 
and intersectional approaches, she explores “racial organising grammar” which 
inherently shapes Dutch society (Wekker 2016: 23). She argued that using 400 
years of colonial history, Dutch society created a “cultural archives” about 
themselves and the colonial others (Wekker 2016: 19). In those archives, white 
Dutch are represented as innocent, polite people who tried to emancipate 
others, while colonised people are represented as lacking the qualities that 
Dutch have. For Wekker, this differentiation through racial lines of 
representation created an archive, which Dutch white nationals still use to 
understand people of different ethnicity and race.  She goes further to claim 
that this cultural archive is updated through the time by incorporating 
xenophobic and Islamophobic policies such as civic integration policy, making 
difference between allochtoon (people from outside) and autochtoon (people from 
inside) categories in official state census and statistical departments, affirming 
that racism is an inherent feature of Dutch society. Her argument is interesting 
as she goes deeper on the micro-level of everyday conversations, television 
programs and state policy discourses where those cultural archives play 
significant role to understand people through racialised distinctions. Although 
all migrants are perceived as the others, Muslim migrants are thought to be 
more problematic within Dutch societies,  especially when gender and sexuality 
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are in question (Wekker 2016: 118-125). Giving example of famous gay 
politician Pim Fortuyn, Wekker argues that Muslim men and women are seen 
as lagging behind modernity.  
Sarah Bracke (2012) also discusses Pim Fortuyn who sees scarf-wearing 
young Dutch Muslim women as infantile, who do not understand what they 
are doing. Fortuyn sees wearing scarf only as a sign of oppression, rather than 
for example, a protest to cultural discrimination, symbol of modesty, or sign of 
religious practice. In this context, Fortuyn wants to save and civilise those 
young women by forcing Dutch norms onto them. By Dutch norms, he means 
gender equality and gay rights. His allies in this struggle come –surprisingly - 
from the feminist corner. Ciska Dresselhuys, chief editor of Dutch feminist 
monthly Opzij, supported Fortuyn arguing that for the greater cause sometimes 
feminist can make ally with the right-wing politician. What was the greater 
cause? Emancipation of Muslim women in the Netherlands. Although 
Dresselhuys criticised various Fortyn’s points and opinion, she still agreed that 
Muslim women need to emancipate and that emancipation comes from 
civilising them by taking off headscarf and incorporating Dutch gender norms. 
Abu-Lughod (2002) describes how similar ideas are also used in the US where 
‘saving Afghan women’ propaganda legitimised attack on Afghanistan. She 
describes that veil can be symbol of many things: a traditional dress, symbol of 
modesty, fashion or a symbol of oppression when women are bound to wear 
it, and not only oppression. Abu-Lughod (2002) points to the colonial 
knowledge production where western ideas become the benchmark to 
understand the non-western world, and continuously shape our understandings 
of people and communities. For Bracke (2012), this colonial idea of 
modernising ‘oriental people’ is still working in the name of feminism in the 
Netherlands. Like colonisers, those feminist - right wing coalitions define 
Muslim women as incompetent, who do not understand their own good and 
whose emancipation can only come from the norms of the West, in this case, 
the Netherlands.  
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 3 Negotiating masculinity and marginality at the workplace 
In this chapter, I will try to explore workplace related experiences of 
Bangladeshi migrant men in The Hague in relation to their perception of 
masculinity. By using comments of the interview, I will explain how colour, 
class, and gender intersection embedded in the positionality and migrant life 
experiences of Bangladeshi migrant men. 
The number of Bangladeshi migrants in the Netherlands is very small. 
According to official data, it about fifteen hundred Bangladeshi migrants live in 
the Netherlands (Van Meeteren et al. 2013: 131). In The Hague, the number is 
even smaller, around 150 people according to my interview source. Bestowing 
to my interviewees, most of the Bangladeshi migrants came to the Netherlands 
at the 1980s and 90s for pursuing better economic life.  In most cases, these 
are single men who came here first, and after getting permission to live in the 
Netherlands, they married and brought their wives to the Netherlands. This 
male only migration may link with the fact that men in Bangladesh thought to 
be main breadwinner and female only migration thought to be a shameful act 
for the family (Dannecker 2005: 660). These men start working in the 
restaurant and some of them eventually become the owner of the restaurant 
(Van Meeteren et al. 2013: 133). It is very interesting to see that most of the 
Bangladeshis in the Netherlands work in the restaurants and in fact many of 
the Indian restaurants in the Netherlands actually own by Bangladeshi migrant 
men (Van Meeteren et al. 2013: 134).  
Their small number creates an obstacle to form a separate community in 
the mind of dominant Dutch representation. In the official document, 
Bangladeshi migrants are part of broader ‘other non-western allochtonen’, which 
comprise non-western migrant people other than Indonesia, Turkey, Morocco 
and Suriname (CBS 2000).  In this respect, Bangladeshi migrants often regard 
as Surinamese or Indian base on their skin colour similarities. However, their 
religious identity creates problem for this representation as most of the 
Surinamese and Indian migrants in the Netherlands are not Muslim. This 
contradict identity of Bangladeshi migrant men is important here as it can 
explore Bangladeshi migrant men positional in the Netherlands in relation to 
their work in the restaurant. Bangladeshi men are very similar with Indian men 
and people from outside Indian subcontinent find it difficult to separate 
Bangladeshi from Indian. Indian food is very popular which speared from 
‘colonial homeland’ – Britain to other European countries. Bangladeshi men 
for this case can easily take advantage of where their skin colour allows people 
to believe that they are buying food from an actual Indian restaurant. 
Sometimes these restaurants owned by Dutch national but the workers and 
sellers are all from Bangladesh which thought to make an influence on the 
customers.  
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Beside this skin colour aspect, there are other practical aspects too. 
Getting a job in the Netherlands is not easy and most cases need some kind of 
diploma. However, for restaurant work they can avoid these things and can 
join straight to work. As my interviewee Iqbal, a former restaurant worker and 
now a chef in the old house centre stated: 
Bangladeshis work in restaurants because you do not need a diploma to get a job 
in a restaurant. I do not know anything when I join the work. Now for the last 15 
years, I learn many things; I take diploma for cooking and cleaning. It's helped 
me. But for the first instance, I did not need any diploma. Moreover, there are 
already some Bangladeshi involve in the restaurant. So it is easy to find a job.  
However, this work demands lots of passion, hard work, and industry. 
They have to work morning to night, sometime in holidays. It left very few 
time for socialisation. They fall in a “vicious circle of working-eating-sleeping-
working” (Farid 2014: 348). Owners have to buy stuff in the restaurant besides 
working for there. Workers also have some personal and family work with that 
restaurant job. Nevertheless, they describe these works are their responsibility 
that they have to do. As Newaz, a restaurant owner stated- 
At first, I was a worker of the same restaurant that I owned now. I worked day 
and night, saved all my money and managed to buy this restaurant. Now I own 
this restaurant but my workload doesn’t lessen. I work as a cashier in my 
restaurant. I also have to buy stuff and look for everything. It just works after 
work. Sometimes I feel like an animal. But you know this thing I have to do. I am 
a man and I feel good when I think that I am providing my family with a good 
life in here. This is my duty and I will always do this! 
Similarly, Mahfuz, a restaurant worker from the restaurant that Newaz 
own, showed his grievance when he stated- 
Sometimes I thought why I came here? I lost many things. I lost my friends, my 
culture, and family. I married 16 years ago. Since then I did not go to any 
marriage occasion. You know how nice marriage occasion is in Bangladesh where 
everybody wants to attend. But when I see my children, I think somebody has to 
sacrifice for the greater future of the family. It is my life, which I sacrifice for my 
children’s future. 
These two statements show that even though some Bangladeshi migrants 
manage to own a restaurant, their life experiences remain bounded in a work-
eat-sleep circle. This is the reason why they do not want their children’s 
involvement in restaurant work or even restaurant business. They like their 
children to be work in a hospital, multinational cooperation, engineering jobs 
etc. When I asked them that those places are highly populated by white Dutch 
people. So is this mean they feel that those jobs are more honourable? They 
agreed and told me that those jobs are more prestigious and argued that white 
people populated there because of their education level are good and there are 
biases based on skin colour. They told me that Turkish and Moroccan people 
(second or third generation) now become more educated but very few of them 
able to find a job in the administrative section or in multinational cooperation. 
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For that reason, they also fear about their children’s future. They blame 
Geert Wilders Islamophobic politics. Many of them discuss the Geert 
Wilders’s Islamophobic short movie Fitna with me3. For them, it creates fear 
among Dutch employer to recruit Muslim men and women in the higher paid 
jobs. Geert Wilders, a political leader of PVV party, won many of seats in the 
Dutch Parliament. He speared negative comment about Muslim migrants and 
asked to reduce migrants. The documentary discusses western value and 
democracy where it showed Islamic ideology a threat for those ideas (Larsson 
2013: 152). This comes to a time when Europe, including the Netherlands, 
shakes by global economic recession. People’s income was getting lesser, job 
market was shrinking, and all the economic sectors were suffering. These 
processes affect in higher paying white Dutch people as well as lower paid 
migrant workers. Wilder manage to convince at least part of the white 
population that it is the migrant people who taking away their jobs. Although 
this is far from true. These migrant people very rarely work on that white 
colour job as Wekker (2016) shown that colonial racial discourse in the 
Netherlands structurally keeps away migrants from those higher paid jobs. It is 
interesting that Wilders mostly discussed the cultural morality of Muslims men 
and danger of the Netherlands for that ‘bad morality’. Nevertheless, that 
unstable situation of the weaker economy made it possible for the white people 
to link their economic crisis with the inferior morality of Muslim men. 
For Bangladeshi men, restaurant work is also important as it fulfils their 
masculine role. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005: 844) discuss how the 
hegemonic idea of maleness also related with femininity. The fact that 
women’s practices and beliefs, which shaped by patriarchal norms also 
reproduce the ideal norms of what can be called as men’s work and what can 
be called as women’s work. For this instance, men who work in lower paid 
become effeminate in that case where men breadwinner role stand as the prime 
factor for masculinity. Men may maintain hegemonic notion and practice of 
masculinity within the home, but subordinate and marginal outside the home, 
at the workplace and in the larger society. 
In contemporary Bangladesh, men role as a breadwinner is seen to be a 
prime factor for hegemonic masculinity whereas hegemonic femininity more 
related with the private sphere, in child care and household maintenance (Khan 
and Townsend 2014: 119). Although shear number women work outside the 
home in recent time, those works still seen related for ideal women. My 
respondents for this research also share the same idea that breadwinner role is 
the core factor for men. They also give importance physical strength and 
behaviour. Nevertheless, breadwinner seems to surpass these all aspects.  
When men were asked about their lower paid jobs and how these affect 
their masculinity, they argued that these jobs are lower paid in the context of 
the Netherlands, but not in Bangladesh. Bartolomei’s (2010) work is relevant 
3 Critical analysis of the content and the debate surrounding the short movie Fitna can 
be found in Larsson, G. (2013) ‘Geert Wilders and the Anti-Muslim Movie Fitna’ in T. 
Hoffmann and G. Larsson (eds.) Muslim and the new information and communication 
technology. Notes from an Emerging Field, pp. 147-162. 
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here. She gives an example of a black man who thinks working under a black 
woman is more humiliating than a white woman as cultural difference gives 
him the advantage of not feeling shameful of working under a white woman 
(as cited in Haile and Siegmann 2014: 108). In the case of Bangladeshi 
restaurant workers in The Hague, this also is true. They live in a Bangladeshi 
bubble where their friends, family, interest and aspiration all link with 
Bangladesh. They do not feel competition with white Dutch men and their 
class status. Another important fact is their living in the Europe itself becomes 
a prestigious aspect.  
All of these factors help them to negotiate with lower paid job status in 
relation with masculinity. As Mahfuz stated his situation- 
Most of the Dutch men may be richer than me but it does not matter for me. I 
do not have any Dutch friends; I do not go their occasion…it’s no mean to me. 
People from Bangladesh, honoured me when they heard that I am living in 
Europe. It doesn’t matter for them what jobs I do in here. My parents in 
Bangladesh also feel honoured because of this. 
However, Mahfuz is working under a Bangladeshi man. Is this not 
creating problem for him? In his idea, this affects very little. People who own 
this type of restaurant are actually not that economically different from 
workers. Most of these restaurants are small (in size) and income is very 
modest. The lower paid workers get subsidy from the government, which helps 
them to maintain at a certain level of economic life. Owners, on the other 
hand, do not get subsidy, which makes them closer to the workers. 
Furthermore, if restaurant work is stigmatised, owners do not get out of that 
stigma as they also involve some form of work in most cases. Class difference, 
however, does not only depend on economic status. As Bourdieu (1977: 85) 
explained social class also reproduces through cultural and social capital like 
education, political network, taste etc. which create a form of ‘habitus’ to 
reproduce class differentiation in the society. Some Bangladeshi migrants in 
The Hague became highly educated and managed to find work in the ‘white 
colour’ section. For instance, Atiqur, a Bangladeshi originated university 
teacher in The Hague, describe his problem on both sides. First of all, his skin 
colour creates an obstacle for him to incorporate in the mainstream and 
secondly, his educational status keeps him apart from other Bangladeshi 
migrants in The Hague. As he stated: 
I have problem from both sides. People who do not know me think I am an 
Indian or Surinamese and these groups of people very rarely become university 
professors. So it is a problem. In general, you will not see these racial 
discriminations but on many occasions, I have to give my occupational status to 
some people to get respect from the people, which my fellow white colleagues do 
not have to. On the other side, I cannot mix with other Bangladeshi migrants in 
here. I try to mix with them but it is difficult. My choice, taste and activity are 
different from them and they also showed less interest to me. So for me, it’s a 
double problem.  
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For Mahfuz and other lower-paid migrant workers, this class difference 
within Bangladeshi men in The Hague means very little. Those people are 
mostly from second or third generation migrants. So, rather than feeling 
competition they feel proud in comparison to the educated Bangladeshi 
migrants. Another important thing is the latter are very few. Maybe four or five 
living in The Hague, which nullified any sense of competition between lower 
waged Bangladeshi migrant men and educated one. 
The situation, however, different in relation with other migrants. 
Bangladeshi migrants work with people from the various ethnic backgrounds. 
Most of them, however, are from non-European countries although there are a 
growing number of Polish migrants working in the restaurant and lower paid 
jobs where Bangladeshi migrants are working. Bangladeshi migrants’ 
perception about these men is little bit complicated. In some cases, they share 
the dominant negative perception of other migrants, in other cases, they feel 
solidarity with them. For example, they perceive Surinamese men as 
‘quarrelling’ and always fighting with each other but still think that they are as 
hardworking as Bangladeshi migrants are. Turkish men are seen as rough in 
behaviour, do not follow Islamic norms but they do go to their mosque for 
prayer. Moroccans are seen as selfish and difficult to work with but their 
women are seen as gentle and generous. These contradictory perceptions about 
their fellow migrants actually show their positionality in the Netherlands. All of 
my interviewees told me that they feel uncomfortable when people called them 
Surinamese. The negative stereotypes which were form in the colonial period 
and continuously shaping understanding about Surinamese people also seem to 
make an effect on the mind of Bangladeshi migrants. This represents 
Foucault’s idea of power where power operates through knowledge and 
everyday practice; not only dominant group but also marginalise groups 
exercise this knowledge which makes it more legitimise (as cited in Sawicki 
1991: 20). Here Bangladeshi migrants perceiving other marginal group from a 
dominant discourse but rejecting the idea that similar idea can also be said 
against them. They, however, found some similarity, e.g. hardworking, between 
them and Surinamese men, which they think is a Bangladeshi characteristic. 
They see the world from their point of view where they accept some dominant 
discourses and reject some. On that worldview, they also found problem in 
Turkish and Moroccan men, which they did not think ideal. Lots of time, my 
interviewees told their bad experiences of work with Turkish and Moroccan 
men. Like Shafiq, a 40 years old shop owner told his experience when he was 
working in a restaurant 
Moroccan and Turkish feel superior from us. They think we are from a poor 
country that’s why we do not know anything. When I was working in the 
restaurant, my fellow Turkish and Moroccan colleague made fun of me. They 
made fun of my eating habit, my Bengali accent; they even teased me when I 
speak. That’s why I left that job and made my own shop. 
However, these Bangladeshi migrant men did not feel the same with 
Moroccan women. They think that these women are generous and dedicated to 
their  family.  They, however, think these cannot be said about Turkish women 
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as they see them caring less about their family. For me, these are all 
stereotypes, which showed Bangladeshi migrants sense of masculinity and 
femininity. They see male breadwinner role and family dedication is the prime 
factor for masculinity. Detaching Turkish and Moroccan man from family 
dedication and breadwinner activity actually make them less ‘man’ than 
Bangladeshi migrants. Making difference among Moroccan and Turkish 
women is also a stereotype, which gives example of their perception of female 
role and femininity. In this way, they also show how women from Bangladesh 
represent ideal femininity. Despite the fact that some of the Bangladeshi 
women work outside, most of my respondents both male and female think 
women’s primary role is in childcare and family maintenance. They think 
woman who dedicates her life to childcare and family is the ideal woman. They 
give various example how Moroccan women take care of their children and 
family despite their husband’s bad behaviour. In this way, they put forward 
their perception of masculinity and femininity. 
Those perceptions differ when they speak about Dutch men and women. 
Most of the time they meet with white Dutch people in office, hospital, 
children’s school premise etc. By talking with them, it feels like these two 
groups have very little conversation in their daily life. In some cases, 
Bangladeshi migrants work under Dutch white owner and some other cases, 
some white Dutch become colleague of Bangladeshi migrants. Nevertheless, 
these situations are very few in comparison to Bangladeshi migrants contact 
and conversation with other migrants or other Bangladeshi migrants. This is 
interesting as they live in a country where the majority of people are white 
Dutch; but they live, work and communicate within their domain where white 
Dutch people become marginal in number. Blokland and Van Eijk (2010: 332) 
showed in their work in Rotterdam that even the place where municipality 
takes the policy to ensure diverse ethnic residency, people rarely mixed with 
other ethnic groups. Part of the reason behind is that these people stay most of 
their time in workplaces and they get less time to meet in the urban area. 
Another part is that sharing same neighbourhood did not mean they are equal 
in class or practice similar behaviour. Because of good transport infrastructure 
in the Netherlands, people can go far away, have discussions and eat and come 
back home for sleep. A similar observation can also be made of Bangladeshi 
migrants’ relation with white Dutch people. Even though they see lots of white 
men and women, very rarely this transforms into a friendly conversation or 
sharing thoughts. Nevertheless, most of the respondents possess positive idea 
about white Dutch people but also give some negative comments regarding 
marriage, and alcohol drinking. Here also they give the indication of their sense 
of masculinity.  
To summarise, Bangladeshi migrant men in The Hague are very small in 
number, which failed to create a sense of single community within dominant 
discourse. Their skin colour, migrant status and ethnic background channel 
them into a constricted set of labour market options, with restaurant work 
being a foremost option. They show their satisfaction and dissatisfaction with 
this at the same time. Working hours, lower status of this job make them 
dissatisfied as they feel they are losing their social life because of work. 
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Satisfaction, on the other hand, is related to their sense of masculinity as it 
fulfils their masculine breadwinner role. They also give importance of family 
integrity and good behaviour as markers for ideal men along with breadwinner 
role. In this respect, they find similarity and dissimilarity with other migrants. 
Most of the time they display stereotypes about other migrants as well as 
Dutch men and women, which actually represent their sense of masculinity and 
femininity. They practice the same dominant racialised discourse, which 
marginalises them within Dutch society when they speak of Surinamese men 
are bad. However, they find some similarities between them in relation to hard 
working. They negotiate their low-paid occupation stressing their better 
behaviour than Moroccan and Turkish man, not quarrelling like Surinamese 
men etc. They put a certain type of femininity – such as Moroccan and 
Bangladeshi women as ideal. For first generation Bangladeshi migrants, religion 
seems to less important than their ethnic and racial identity. However, they do 
feel worry about their children’s future because of Islamophobic discourse in 
the Netherlands. They feel it can be an issue in the higher paid jobs where their 
child will compete. Nevertheless, religion does appear an important marker in 
the family and social sphere for the first generation Bangladeshi migrant men, 
which I will explain in the next two chapters. 
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4 Being a proper family man 
Family is an important social organisation in Bangladesh as Sarah White (2002: 
1098) showed persons inside the family are not mere “detached individuals”, 
but rather their selves and personhood are “essentially constituted” through 
the relationship with other members. In this respect, person’s identity in 
relation with family drives what he can do and give meaning to it (ibid). 
Through this process, individuals become a man or a woman and give meaning 
to their role. Power relation in the family in Bangladesh is not neutral as a man 
gets more opportunity to practice their power over a woman. However, this in 
no way means that he has complete autonomy. His power is restricted to his 
masculine role and failure to maintain that role can crumble his power. 
Moreover, not all men can practice power equally and there is a hierarchy 
among men and among women inside a family. As Sarah White (1997: 17), 
showed older men have authority over younger men and as Deniz Kandiyoti 
(1988: 279) showed in South Asian case, a mother-in-law practices power over 
her daughter-in-law in the domain of patriarchal bargain. Hence, a man may 
have more chance to manoeuvre his power but there are also some limitations.  
For Bangladeshi migrant men in The Hague, family norms in Bangladesh 
still play an important role. In general, this is because of two reasons. First, 
most of them are first generation migrants; they were raised and spent a 
significant amount of time in Bangladesh. Secondly, most of them married in 
Bangladesh and brought their wives after they secured job and got legal status 
to live in the Netherlands permanently. So their family composition is based on 
the Bangladeshi social and gender norms. Moreover, their continuous living in 
a Bangladeshi bubble, which I explained in the previous chapter, and regular 
contact with people back home remind them about Bangladeshi family norms. 
However, migration and new social environment do have some effects on their 
perception of family values. All of my respondents mention their family norms 
and values as a core issue in their life. By family norms, they argue about their 
dedication to the family, caring for children and successful marriage 
partnership. For male migrants, the family norms seem to be their main 
bargaining point in coping with lower job status and lower social position. As 
Shafiq, a shop owner stated: 
One thing you need to understand is that the trees will grow well if you take care 
of them.  In my family, I take care of my children. They are getting a good 
education from here but my wife and I teach them about morality and 
truthfulness. We try to secure our children’s future. For that reason, you will see 
our children will not become addicted to alcohol and our daughter will not 
engage in the bad social behaviour. I feel good to see my family in good order; it 
takes away all of my sorrow.   
Like Shafiq, most of the Bangladeshi migrants put childcare, or in their 
words manush korano (making them better humans), as their main work in their 
family. Yet, when I asked what they do for their children’s care as a father, 
male respondents of my research gave their economic provision as the main 
factor, which they think, is helping their children’s future. However, for the 
nurturing and caring, women do the most of the work. Women too see their 
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main work as childcare and household work like cleaning and cooking. 
However, men also do the care work occasionally. However, it is rather as 
‘helping’ their wives than perceiving household work as their own work. The 
case of Mahfuz and Shova can be helpful to understand this issue. 
Shova came to the Netherlands with her father. After few months, she 
faced harassment from her father. She complained to the local police office 
and managed to leave her father’s place. At that time, she was only 19 and did 
not have a legal permit to stay. After five years, she managed to get permission. 
She was working in a restaurant where she met and fell in love with Mahfuz, a 
Bangladeshi migrant who was illegal at that time. They got married and Mahfuz 
got legal citizenship. They continued to work in the same restaurant. However, 
when their first child was born, Shova left the job. Until now, she is 
‘unemployed’. Shova, however, does not agree on unemployment status. As 
she stated: 
I am taking care of my child and securing his future. If I involve in jobs who’s 
going to take care of my child? I neither believe that childcare centre can take 
proper care of my child nor I have money to spend there. Mir’s (Shova’s son) 
father work morning to night. He is also not able to take care of him. So, I am 
not unemployed; I am doing job – I am taking care of my children. 
Mahfuz, on the other hand, works morning to night to maintain their 
family and covers for the absence of Shova’s income. This is the thing that he 
believes he has to do. For him: “…somebody has to sacrifice. I am providing 
money for my family; that’s my job and Shova taking care of household and 
children - that’s her job”. Mahfuz cooks and cleans during the weekend. He 
regards these works as helping to Shova. Shova too perceives her husband’s 
cooking and cleaning work as a help. She constantly expresses her good feeling 
about her husband in relation to his household work. Nevertheless, she 
foremost praises her husband’s economic provision for the family, which she 
believes, is the main job for men. She told me that she never mentions to her 
family in Bangladesh that her husband does the occasional cooking and 
cleaning, which for her may create disrespect. In her words: 
I never told my mother that Mahfuz cooks. In Bangladesh, men do not do the 
household works. People have housemaids there. But in here men need to help 
their wives. They will not understand our situation. Mahfuz is such good 
husband. He works all day and night and when he gets time, he helps me as well. 
From Shova’s statement, it is clear that she sees her husband’s household 
work as help, and not his responsibility. She protects her husband’s image 
within their family back home, which may be damaged by his household work. 
For her, he is ‘helpful’ and a ‘good human’. In this process, she also reproduces 
hegemonic notions of masculinity and femininity. When I visited their home 
for my interview, Shova did not allow her husband to do the cooking despite 
the fact that it was a weekend, when he would usually do it. She believed that 
showing her husband’s involvement in cooking to another Bangladeshi man – 
myself – would degrade not only her husband's masculinity but also her 
femininity, as she may be perceived as a woman who is not doing her 
responsibility.  
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Although context and perspectives may be different, I have also found 
such perceptions of masculinity and femininity in other cases as well. In the 
case of Zaman and Rima, this perception is also found though Rima works 
outside the home, next to household works. Zaman works in a big restaurant 
and also owns a grocery shop. He works morning to noon at the restaurant 
and thereafter in the shop. However, he is not regular in the shop. It is Rima 
who manages the shop most of the time. She also does the household works. 
Although a vast amount of their income comes from the shops, it is Zaman 
who is perceived as the main economic provider. When I ask Rima about her 
work in the shop, she argued that she is just helping Zaman. She constantly 
showed her grievance about working in the shop, which she thinks she has to 
do because of her child’s future. Their daughter is studying at the university; 
therefore, they have to spend a large amount of money on her education. Rima 
told me that when her daughter’s study would finish, she would stop working 
in the shop. She also mentions Zaman’s hard work and dedication for their 
family. In this way, she too is balancing the idea of her husband’s masculinity 
with his dedication and good manners. Like Shova, she also thinks 
breadwinning is not women’s responsibility. Whereas Shova sees her husband’s 
household work as helping her, Rima sees her own work outside the home as 
helping her husband.  
The situation gets complicated when they speak about their daughters’ 
role in the family, as most of them want their daughters to work outside the 
home after their marriage. However, they still prefer that their daughters’ 
partners’ income should higher than the income of their daughters. This leads 
to the question whether they really think a man as a sole breadwinner and a 
woman as a sole home keeper. Their aspiration for their daughters to work 
outside the home may indicate that they question hegemonic gender roles in 
the family, but their preference for higher earning of son in laws offers a 
different picture. The fact is, women who work outside the home, even in high 
paid jobs, do not always escape from their responsibility of childcare and 
household work. Similarly, preferring higher earning of son in law reflects a 
sense of hegemonic male and female role in the family and understanding of 
men as main economic provider and women as main child care provider and 
household worker. Men may help in household work, or women may help in 
the economic provision, but their main responsibility remains within 
hegemonic norms.  
These examples suggest what Connell and Messerschmidt (2005: 848) 
argued: women themselves can reproduce gender hierarchies. Similarly, we can 
also argue that racially marginalised people can also reproduce racist hierarchy. 
In the previous chapter, I have discussed how Bangladeshi migrants believe 
that their breadwinner role and family dedication are important attributes 
through which they see themselves better than other migrant men. Same apply 
here as Bangladeshi migrants see white Dutch and Surinamese people as 
having lack of family dedication. They gave me example of big percentage of 
divorce rate among these groups. They also argued that these groups of people 
do not take care of their children and their children face problem when they 
see their parents living separately. However, they make further distinctions 
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noting that Dutch have good manners, even better than Bangladeshis. They 
gave lots of example of good behaviour, attitude and pleasantness. It seems 
like they are also trying to learn these behaviours like talking with smile, eating 
early in the evening and maintaining order in the public places. I argued with 
them that these habits could also be found in Bangladesh but they disagreed 
with me and argued that white Dutch people do it better.  
It is interesting to note that Bangladeshi migrants – according to their own 
statements – meet with white Dutch people mostly in the official arena when 
they need something, or in the restaurants, where Dutch come as customers. 
Bangladeshi informants did not socialise with Dutch at home, and in other 
spaces – such as on the streets – these two groups seem to simply pass by each 
other.  On the other hand, Bangladeshi interviewees have very negative 
stereotypes of Surinamese, as bad people, often involved in stealing and 
drinking, and not following rules etc. It seems that racial hierarchy within 
Dutch society also influences their perceptions, as my Bangladeshi informants 
assume that all Surinamese are black – therefore ‘bad people’.  The colonial 
racial hierarchical discourse along with the lower class status of Surinamese 
migrant people seems to have an effect even in the mind of marginalised group 
such as Bangladeshi migrants. In the line of family dedication, neither white 
Dutch nor Surinamese people seem to live up to the ideal for Bangladeshi 
migrants. However, they do mention some good aspects of white Dutch family 
life, such as fathers carry children in their hands when they go outside. For 
Bangladeshi men, this is a good ‘helping’ attitude. Nevertheless, they argue that 
Dutch family norms are problematic as they lead to divorce or separation, and 
they see both Dutch men and Dutch women responsible. Mirza, a magician 
who was married to a white Dutch woman and got divorced after five years 
told me:  
Living with Dutch woman is difficult you know. My former wife expected that I 
should do the household work as well as the outside job. We tried to get along 
but it was difficult because we were raised up in a different environment. It was 
hard for me to break the family but I could not help it. 
Although Mirza mentions different understanding for that breakup, he 
nevertheless accuses Dutch family norms, which for him creates vulnerability 
for a stable marriage. Mirza later married a woman from Bangladesh. However, 
he now most of the time stays at home as his magician work is not as 
successful as in the earlier times. Because of being home without work, he is 
now facing stigma from Bangladeshi community. For Mirza what makes a 
proper man is his compassion and dedication to the family. He takes care of 
his children.  By taking care, he means he takes them to school, gives them 
religious education, feeds them and takes them to the field for play. His 
experience is, however, different from other Bangladeshi migrants as he 
stresses the importance of household work. Nevertheless, he relates his work 
with religion: his religion taught him to take care of home and family, and – in 
his opinion - makes him a better man. It seems like he is balancing his stigma 
of non-involving in regular paid jobs with religious dedication.  
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Religion does, in fact, play a significant role in the family sphere of 
Bangladeshi migrant men’s position in The Hague. Bangladesh is a country 
where ninety percent people are Muslim4. Religion there as Sarah White 
showed “does not appear in the classic modernist formulation as something set 
apart, but rather as interwoven with and giving meaning to other aspects of 
daily living” (2012: 1445). Similarly, my respondents put Islam in the core of 
their family and intimate relationship, as all of my respondents are in fact 
Muslims. However, there seems to be a paradox in this understanding of Islam 
in relation to their migrant status. On the one hand, they fear that their 
children may follow some ‘un-Islamic’ activity to fit into Dutch society, 
because of their minority status. On the other hand, they think they can 
practice their religion better because of migration. In the first aspect, they fear 
that their children, especially girls, may engage in a sexual relationship before 
marriage, which for them is neither Bangladeshi nor Islamic norm. They feel 
this can happen because they live in a society where such practice is ‘normal’. 
Therefore, they try to teach their children Islamic norms and beliefs at very 
early age. Many times my respondents have shown me how their children learn 
about Qur’an and Islamic norms. Other aspects of that paradox come from 
this learning process. They think their children have a better opportunity to 
learn about Islam in the Netherlands than in Bangladesh. Although Bangladesh 
is a Muslim majority country, they think people there do not understand 
Qur’an and its interpretation in a proper way. In The Hague, they argue, 
Turkish and Moroccan mosques offer a better understanding. In this way, they 
actually criticise Bangladesh and uphold Turkish and Moroccan migrants.  As 
Mirza stated: 
I sent my children to learn Qur’an in a nearby Turkish mosque. Here Imam 
teaches them Qur’an with good interpretation. So my children learn and 
understand Quran. But in Bangladesh, you know everybody interprets it as they 
like. People are doing lots of un-Islamic work in the name of Islam. My children 
even teach me about what should I do. 
These ideas give a sense of solidarity between Turkish and Moroccan 
migrants with Bangladeshi migrants in The Hague. It also shows that 
Bangladeshi migrants actually think that Turks and Moroccans are better 
Muslim than they are. This may be related to the idea that those two countries 
have a long history of Islamic rule under caliphate. In contrast, Bangladesh was 
never under caliphate and pre-Islamic traditions are still dominant “which 
emphasise [Islam’s] syncretism and malleability, it is grounding in Sufi thought 
and long co-residence with Hindu neighbours giving many different and 
localised traditions of practice and belief” (White 2012: 1431). However, such 
ideas do not count when Bangladeshi respondents talk about family and sexual 
relationships. For them, some Turkish and Moroccan people are dedicated to 
their family but others drink alcohol, involve in sexual relationship before 
marriage and practice polygamy. They see the adoption of ‘Dutch style of 
living’ and ‘not following Islamic values’ as the main reasons. However, this 
4 Exactly, it is 90.39% according to Population and Housing Census 2011 in 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statics report 2015.   
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actually shows their hegemonic understanding of family and intimate 
relationships. It will be hard to argue that all Bangladeshi migrants do not 
involve in pre-marriage sex, have the high dedication to their family and never 
drink alcohol. They see these things as ideals, which at the same time create 
solidarity with other communities through religious identity but also reproduce 
colonial racial hierarchy by giving certain attribute to those same migrant 
groups. 
Above discussion showed the perception of masculinity and femininity 
linked with family relations among my Bangladeshi respondents. They 
understand family as a core social institution where they perceive men’s role as 
breadwinner and women as child caring, despite their aspiration to see their 
daughters in a paid job outside the household. They justify this in religious 
terms and thus create a paradox whereby they feel solidarity with other 
marginal group but at the same time adopt certain colonial racial discourses. 
They balance their masculinity and femininity by accepting those discourses in 
some situations and rejecting them in others. 
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5 Migrant bubbles: living in the Netherlands 
In the previous two chapters, I have explored how Bangladeshi migrant men 
position themselves in family and workplace sphere in relation to their various 
intersectional identities such as Islamic religious identity, brown skin colour, 
Bangladeshi national and ethnic identity, and marginal migrant and economic 
status. Research findings show that these various interconnected identities 
sometimes give them advantage and sometimes make them vulnerable. Their 
understanding of masculinity is situated within the ambiguities between 
advantages and vulnerabilities. In this chapter, I will further explore these 
ambiguities by using two interrelated concepts – ‘coloniality of power’ and 
‘colonial immigrants’ – while reflecting on how are Bangladeshi migrant men 
situated within the broader Dutch society. 
Coloniality of power, discussed by Anibal Quijano (2000), refers to the 
power relation between colonisers and colonised, based on the social 
classification of human population through the race. Quijano (2000: 215) 
defines race as “a mental construct that expresses colonial experience and that 
pervades the most important dimensions of world power, including its specific 
rationality: Eurocentrism”. For her, the racial classification, which was created 
in the colonial mode of production, is still present in the contemporary 
capitalism. The colonised non-white people who were used as slaves and 
forced labourers to create surplus for the industrialisation of the white Western 
world and Europe have now become cheap labourers who continue producing 
surplus for the global north. In this line of exploitation, the axis between white 
superior and black/brown/olive ‘inferior races’ reinforces and actively 
contributes to the world system of thought, ideas as well as capital. Grosfoguel 
et al. (2015) use this ‘coloniality of power’ concept to understand the situation 
of migrant workers in Europe. For him, migrant workers who live and work in 
their ‘colonial homeland’ live in a circumstance where racial/ethnic hierarchy 
in relation to colonial discourse is endlessly present (Grosfoguel et al. 2015: 
642). These migrants are thought to be inferior to the dominant white group 
and live and work with a lower social status. For Grosfoguel, the situation of 
the migrants who are from peripheral location and are not directly colonised by 
the country in which they live is not different from the colonial subjects. 
Because of the colonial racial discourse, these people also understood as 
colonial subject and also live inferior life. He called this group ‘colonial 
immigrants’. 
How can these two concepts help us understand the situation of 
Bangladeshi men in the Netherlands? Bangladeshi migrants live in a country, as 
Wekker (2016) argued, where racial grammar – which was created in the 
colonial period to make hierarchy between colonisers and colonised – is still 
present and even became a dominant discourse. Netherlands’ 400 years of 
colonial exploitation of Indonesia, Surinam and other places made possible for 
a tiny nation to become a world super economic power (Wekker 2016: 5). The 
processes  of  exploitation  continue even after the colonial empire broke down 
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through accumulations of capital by Dutch multinational companies. Racial 
discourses continue to be used as a benchmark to understand people who 
migrated from various colonialized locations.  
Examples of this racial grammar can be found in the Zwarte Piet debate 
and in civil integration discourse. Zwarte Piet, a black face character of annual 
Sinterklaas ceremony plays a servant role of white Saint Nicolas. People from 
the various corners of Dutch society have criticised this representation of the 
black character as a servant, which for them signify colonial racial discourse of 
black as inferior. Surprisingly, many white Dutch people continue to defend 
that Zwarte Piet character and justify it as tradition and for children. Their 
argument actually reflects how the racial grammar is deeply embedded in 
Dutch society. Arguments about tradition and children’s celebration show how 
Dutch society normalises colonial racial hierarchy. Integration law is another 
example of the colonial racial discourse. Started from 2005, this law aims to 
assimilate migrants within Dutch society. One of the reasons behind the 
introduction of this law is that migrants, especially Muslim migrants, are 
generally defined as homophobic, misogynous and morally inferior, thus in 
need to be taught the so-called ‘Dutch values’ (Wekker 2016: 55). It is 
sometimes difficult to understand what is precisely meant by ‘core Dutch 
values’, but ideas about homosexuality and women’s emancipation have 
become part of Dutch norms and are now used to restrict immigration and 
sustain discursive differences between white Dutch and Muslim migrants. 
These discourses represent the colonial racial hierarchies where colonial white 
master position himself as superior and try to teach morally inferior non-
white/non-western/colonialized students.  
When Bangladeshi migrants come to a place where colonial racial 
hierarchy shapes social reality, they too become part of the inferior subject, 
although Bangladesh was not colonised by the Netherlands. For migrant men, 
the reality of racist colonial legacies becomes an integral part of their position 
in society. Within such colonial hierarchy, Bangladeshi migrant men find 
themselves at the bottom. Their lower paid job status creates obstacle to 
achieving ideal hegemonic masculine figure as economic status plays significant 
role in the hierarchy of masculinity. Their skin colour and ethnicity also make 
them other. Discussion of Mrinalini Sinha (1995) can help us to understand 
this little more. Sinha argued that colonial Britain compared Bengali men with 
British women within the colonial racial hierarchy. In the latter half of the 
nineteenth century when Bangladesh was part of British India, some Bengali 
men manage to gain higher education from Britain and become eligible for 
jobs, which were usually occupied by white British men. These ‘newly 
educated’ men’s demand for those jobs created problem for the colonial 
administration. On the one hand, these people need to be recognised as 
educated from ‘colonial homeland’; on the other hand, it created problem as it 
implied that Bengali men could be equal to white British men. According to 
Sinha (1995:35), the way out of this paradox was to redefine Bengali men are 
effeminate and thus lack the capacity to govern. The same lack was used by the 
British establishment in denying women the right to vote. As Sir Lepel Griffin, 
a senior Anglo-Indian official stated at the time:  
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Although it would be both impertinent and paradoxical to compare English 
women – the most courageous, charming and beautiful of the daughters of Eve – 
with Bengali agitators, yet it is a curious fact that the question of admitting 
Bengalis to political power, occupies in British India, the same place that in 
England is taken by the question of the extension of the vote to women, both 
may be advocated on somewhat similar grounds and both may be refused in 
compliance with the necessities of the same arguments (as cited in Sinha 1995: 
35). 
This colonial assumption of effeminacy that makes Bengali men ineligible 
for higher paid jobs in colonial Britain can be related to dominant discourses 
about Bangladeshi migrants within Dutch society. Bangladeshi men are a 
colonial other, albeit not being Dutch colonial subject. They are a different 
other than Surinamese and Indonesians who were direct Dutch colonial 
subjects, but they are other, nevertheless. Bangladeshi migrant men belong to 
the lower socio-economic strata of the society; their colour differentiates them 
from white Dutch, and their religious identity is also an important element in 
comparing them to the ideals of masculinity in Dutch society. Because Muslim 
men are thought to be morally inferior, Bangladeshi migrant men go further 
away from dominant Dutch idea of hegemonic masculinity. All these aspects 
push Bangladeshi migrant men to the marginal position.  
However, not all of them have exactly the same weight, nor play the same 
role either in the lives of individual migrants or in the migrant community. 
This research has found that the process of marginalisation is rather complex 
and dynamic. In the colonial racial discourse, Bangladeshi migrant men 
become inferior because of their brown skin colour as well as their Islamic 
religious identity. These two aspects, however, do not always join together. 
Brown skin and facial features of Bangladeshi men mark them different from 
the physical appearance of Turkish, Moroccan and other Middle Eastern men 
who face the brunt of Islamophobic and xenophobic discourses and practices 
in the Netherlands. Thus, in a way, Bangladeshi men are racialised but ideas 
about race also protect them to some extent and help them to remain 
unexposed. The case of Shafiq may help us to understand this ambiguity 
between protection and exposure:  
Shafiq used to work in an Indian restaurant when he first came to the 
Netherlands. After his application for asylum had been accepted, he was 
offered a house in a village near Utrecht. As the process of acquiring the house 
was taking very long, he went to the housing office to inquire about the 
situation. He met his restaurant owner’s wife who happened to be a clerk in 
that office. She told Shafiq that village inhabitants had written a letter to the 
municipality that they do not want a foreigner and a Muslim in their 
neighbourhood, and that is why the process is taking so long. She 
photographed him and sent his picture to all the neighbourhoods, also telling 
that Shafiq has Dutch citizenship and thus has the right to live there. After 
some days, local people accepted him and he got his house. Maaike, who was 
the officer of the housing department, told Shafiq that it was easy for local 
people to accept Shafiq because he looked like an Indian man, and village 
people felt more threatened by Turkish and Moroccan people whose facial 
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features are different, and whose skin is usually whiter than that of Bangladeshi 
people. Moreover, people knew very little about Bangladesh, which also helped 
Shafiq. As he stated: 
People here do not know about Bangladesh. They think we are either Indian or 
Surinamese. When I told them that I am from Bangladesh, they did not care! 
Even who knew only asked about the flood situation! 
Shafiq told me that people later got surprised when they heard from him 
that ninety percent of people in Bangladesh are Muslims. Shafiq argued that it 
was easy for him to mix with the people at that time as people perceived him 
as a poor person from Bangladesh, not as a Muslims. He did not go to the 
mosque during that time and cultivated vegetables, an activity he shares with 
other community members. However, the situation changed when he brought 
his wife in the Netherlands. His wife wears a headscarf and he started going to 
the mosque then. At this point, he felt alienated from the neighbourhood and 
moved to The Hague where other Bangladeshi people live. 
Shafiq’s case shows us that his skin colour – while important in racist 
discourses - as well as a lesser-known national identity, did, in fact, help him to 
remain unexposed as a Muslim – and thus protect him for a while from 
Islamophobic discourses. However, when he and his wife showed their Muslim 
identity openly, the situation become a little bit difficult for them. He told me 
that he never faced direct confrontation but he found the change in the 
attitude of his white Dutch neighbours. Therefore, in social sphere skin colour 
and ethnic identity do give Bangladeshi migrants some sort of protection 
although there is no guarantee that this will have a lasting effect. Other 
Bangladeshi migrants also shared their experiences of situations where their 
skin colour and nationality helped them to mix with white Dutch community, 
but later become unimportant. Rohmat, for example, told that he used to live 
in a village called Uden. He was the only Muslim in that village, but people did 
not perceive him as Muslims, seeing him through his dark skin:  
People in that village initially thought I am an Indian and Hindu. They regularly 
say Namestey to me. I told them I am a Muslim. But because of my wife’s sari and 
our food habit, they keep thinking of us as Indian. It was not bad because you 
know people, especially older people, do not like Muslims here. But when the 
Paris attack happened, some people burned a mosque in a nearby village. I got 
scared. I saw the hatred in people’s eyes, the same people who were previously 
thinking I was Hindu and Indian. So I applied for a new house and came to 
Hague a few months after.  
So, skin colour and ethnic identity do not always have an effect but they 
may play a crucial role to minimise the importance of other identities in 
specific context. However, the skin colour can make migrants vulnerable to 
racism, as ‘cultural archives’ about white and non-white people may have an 
effect within Dutch racial hierarchies. Yet, this research found that Bangladeshi 
migrants very rarely compare themselves with white Dutch men. Actually, the 
restaurant industry where they mainly work is very much occupied by migrant 
communities, and white Dutch people are either owners or customers, but 
seldom co-workers. For this reason, Bangladeshi migrants accept the higher 
38 
 
social and economic position of white Dutch people. Rather than competing 
with white Dutch men economically or financially, they stress the ways money 
is used.   
For them, economic providing and family dedication are the most 
important characteristics of masculinity. In this aspect, they found they are 
better than white Dutch men are because whatever earning they make, they 
spend on their family welfare and children’s future, which, according to them, 
migrants from the other communities and white Dutch men do very rarely. It 
is not the amount of money that matters, they stress, rather the dedication to 
the family. As Shova stated: 
My husband earns 1200 euro a month and spends all this money for the family. 
A person may earn 4000 or 5000 euros but if he does not look after his family, 
spends money for selfish reasons like smoking, alcohol, going to night club etc., 
he is not ideal husband or father. But Mahfuz (Shova’s husband) not only earns, 
but also takes care of the family. He is a better man. 
Connell and Messerschmidt (2005: 849) showed that hegemonic 
masculinity is not a static factor and it may be different in different places and 
times. Similarly, Bangladeshi migrants adhere to specific ideals of masculine 
hegemony that – in their views – position them differently from dominant 
Dutch ideals of masculinity. Bangladeshi migrants give various meanings to 
their life as a man. For them, currently, Islamophobia is the main problem, 
which they fear may create problems for their children. In this, Bangladeshi 
migrants become closer to other Muslim migrants in the Netherlands. 
Although they possess negative ideas about Moroccan and Turkish men 
regarding family matters, in the social sphere they found solidarity with those 
groups. Most of the Imams in the Mosques in The Hague are Turkish or 
Moroccan. For that reason, Bangladeshi people call those mosques Turkish or 
Moroccan mosques. Nevertheless, they go to these mosques to teach their 
children Qur’an and express their commonality with other Muslims. As Mirza 
stated:  
Turks and Moroccans are main Muslim communities in the Netherlands.  When 
they hear that, I am Muslims they hug me, and they even offer to help us when 
they hear we are Muslims.   
However, this solidarity does not remain stable all the time as some 
Bangladeshi migrant’s experiences show. They feel their ethnic identity and 
way of dressing differentiates them from Middle Eastern Muslims and creates 
problems. Mahfuz has stated:  
Turkish and Moroccan migrants think they are better Muslims than us. Because 
Prophet Muhammad (S) is born in the Middle East, they think they know Islam 
better than us. But the fact is we are following more Islamic practice than they 
do.  They told that sari that our women wear is not Islamic because you can see 
women’s belly. But they also wear similar kind of stuff. It doesn’t matter what 
kind of dress you wear. What matters is how you wear it. If you cover your body 
with your dress, then it does not matter what you wear. 
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Nonetheless, Bangladeshi migrants still often feel closer to those 
communities than other migrants in the Netherlands. As the Islamophobia 
increases and religious identity becomes an important factor of exclusion and 
marginalisation in the Netherlands, these migrant groups feel more solidarity 
with each other. This solidarity should not be taken for granted, however. 
Ambiguous sentiments of my Bangladeshi respondents show that it is tested 
through various social encounters and their different histories, where race, 
colour, social and economic status and religion all play a role in specific, but 
often paradoxical and ambiguous ideals of masculinity. Nevertheless, the 
contemporary dominance of Islamophobia and negative perceptions of Muslim 
men especially creates conditions for solidarity, as much as dynamics of race or 
class may create conditions for differentiation between migrant groups. 
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6 Conclusion 
In this study, I have tried to give answer to the question how gender, race, 
colour, class and religion/Islam are implicated in social location and 
experiences of manhood among Bangladeshi migrants in the Netherlands. I 
used feminist intersectional approach, as well as concepts of coloniality and 
hegemonic masculinity to understand how Bangladeshi migrant men in The 
Hague positioned themselves in relation with other Muslim migrant 
communities and with white Dutch men, and focused on their perceptions and 
experiences at the workplace, in the family and in broader Dutch society. 
Research findings show that gender, race, colour, class and religion impact 
social location of Bangladeshi men. However, the process is much more 
dynamic and complex than I previously imagined.  
First, various literatures show that Muslims migrants in the Netherlands 
face problems because of Islamophobic and xenophobic discourses, as well as 
because of colonial racist discourses. Although Bangladesh was not colonised 
by the Netherlands, their reality is linked to colonial racial hierarchy where 
white Dutch men are on the top and Bangladeshi migrant men close to the 
bottom. Their skin colour, lower paid work along with the history of 
colonialism by Britain push them into the group of other migrants who were 
directly colonised by the Netherlands, while the Islamophobic discourse makes 
them more vulnerable. This situation is worse for men than for women 
because men are thought to pose more threats.   
However, this process of marginalisation of Bangladeshi men is not 
straightforward.  The skin colour and religious identity of Bangladeshi men do 
not always work together in the process of marginalisation. Actually, the skin 
colour seems to give men protection, as they are often perceived to be Indians 
or Surinamese. The fact that most migrants from India and Suriname are not 
Muslims means that the skin colour initially hides Bangladeshi migrants’ 
religious identity and helps them avoid the brunt of Islamophobic discourse. 
However, the research findings show that, once Bangladeshi migrants disclose 
their religious identity, they also face Islamophobia. However, Bangladeshi 
migrants are especially worried that Islamophobic discourse in the Netherlands 
can create problems for their children. Most of the Bangladeshi migrants in 
The Hague work in lower-paid jobs. For that reason, they feel less competition 
with white Dutch people who are mostly occupied the white colour jobs. 
Besides, they do not socialise much with Dutch, staying much more within 
Bangladeshi community. However, for the second generation, Bangladeshi 
migrants aspire to see their children in better-paid and more prestigious jobs 
where they have to compete with white Dutch. For that reason, Bangladeshi 
migrants fear that their children may face problem if current Islamophobic 
discourse continues. 
Second, the perception of masculinity of Bangladeshi men is related with 
their religious, racial and ethnical identity. Their skin colour and similarity with 
‘Indian’  help  them  to  involve  with  restaurant  work.  Although  they  share 
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dissatisfaction with these jobs, it nonetheless fulfils their aspirations of 
masculinity, which emphasised men’s breadwinning role. However, 
Bangladeshi migrants also give importance to family integrity and good 
manners. In this respect, they create stereotype about white Dutch men and 
women, as well as about other migrant communities. This research argues that 
stereotypes are produced through the intersection of masculinity and 
femininity with other power relations, and especially ethnicity, race and 
religion. For instance, Bangladeshi migrant men have negative stereotypes of 
Turkish and Moroccan men, seeing them as not having good manners. On the 
other hand, they possess positive idea about Moroccan women who, for them, 
are lot more caring about family, which reflects Bangladeshi migrant men’s 
sense of ideal masculinity and femininity. Religion is important here as they 
relate their sense of masculinity with following proper religious practices and 
adhering to religious doctrine.  Those stereotypes create a paradox where 
Bangladeshi men possess negative ideas in relation to Turkish and Moroccan 
men’s family dedication and good manners, but uphold them as the best 
representative of Muslims in the Netherlands and go to their mosque for 
religious practice. 
Third, Bangladeshi migrant men negotiate their marginalised masculinity 
by stressing their own good manners, family dedication along with 
breadwinner role, where they perceive themselves better than white Dutch 
men and other migrant men. Bangladeshi migrants live within a ‘Bangladeshi 
bubble’ in The Hague. Most of their friends and acquaintances are 
Bangladeshi. Sometimes they also work under a Bangladeshi restaurant owner. 
They have regular contacts with Bangladesh. Thus, they seldom mix with other 
migrant communities in the Netherlands, or with Dutch. In this circumstance, 
their perception of masculinity is related not only to the reality of the 
Netherlands but also to Bangladesh. They may be marginalised in the 
Netherlands, but living in the Netherlands itself gives them higher status and 
pride in Bangladesh. Therefore, ideals of white Dutch masculinity appear to 
have very little to do with Bangladeshi migrants’ life. Very rarely, they compete 
with white dominant Dutch people, and enclosure into the Bangladeshi bubble 
helps them ignoring masculinity ideals of broader Dutch society. They create 
their own hierarchies of masculinity within where they criticise Dutch family 
norms, which they see as problematic for successful long-term marriage. 
However, even if Bangladeshi migrant may ignore what white Dutch men may 
think about them, they cannot ignore what other migrant men think. In their 
workplace, their competition is with other migrant communities. In this 
respect, they perceive themselves better than other migrant men: better 
behaviour than Moroccans, not quarrelling like Surinamese and better family 
dedication than Turkish. In this way, they create hierarchies about ideal 
manhood and place themselves on the top.  
Overall, experiences of Bangladeshi migrant men in The Hague alerts us 
that ideals of hegemonic masculinity do not operate in a simple way, that is- 
dominant men shape how marginalised men understand masculinity. Rather, 
my research shows that men from marginalised corners can ignore some 
aspects of dominant discourses and create masculine hierarchies of their own. 
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In some contexts, skin colour, and lower economic status of Bangladeshi men 
protect them from Islamophobic discourse and competitions with dominant 
white Dutch masculinities, while in other contexts their ethnic and religious 
identities come to the surface and expose them to xenophobic and colonial 
racist discourse. Their positionality as migrant Muslim men in The Hague is 
situated in this ambiguity between protection and vulnerability. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I: Profile of the Respondents of this Research 
 
Pseudo 
Name 
Age Sex Occupation Year of living 
in Netherlands 
Mirza 45 Male Magician 25 
Zaman 50 Male Restaurant worker 
and shop owner 
19 
Rima 40 Female Shop owner and 
household work 
13 
Mahfuz 30 Male Restaurant worker 6 
Shova 27 Female Household work 8 
Rohmat 35 Male Food processing 
industry 
10 
Iqbal 42 Male Chef in an old home 
centre 
20 
Atiqur 37 Male University teacher 15 
Newaz 40 Male Restaurant owner 20 
Shafiq 40 Male Shop owner 11 
 
I met with Zaman and his wife Rima in program organised by Bangladesh 
embassy. He was very friendly to me and invited me to his home. I went there 
and met Shova and Mahfuz. I explain them my research idea and they all 
appreciate. I proposed them to be the interviewee for my research and they 
agree. At that point, my idea was broad; I was looking for the marginalisation 
they faced in the Netherlands. We discussed various issues including the 
political situation in Bangladesh, which is always a discussing point for 
Bangladeshi migrants in here. They shared their experience of how they 
manage to stay in Netherlands and differences between Bangladesh and 
Netherlands. All of them told me that they have many interesting stories to tell 
which may help me. Later on that month, Shova invited me along my wife in 
her house. It is customary in Bangladeshi culture to invite and feed a people 
whom you feel friendly. I felt good that they took me as their friend, which 
helped me talking with them freely and discussing something, which otherwise 
they may not share. I went there and met with Newaz, Rohmat and Mirza. It 
was a big opportunity for me and they all agreed to be interviewed. On the 
case of Atiqur, I met him in an embassy program and explained my research to 
him. He also agreed to give interview. 
Making schedule for interview with Shova, Mahfuz, Zaman and Rima 
were easy as they regularly invited me in their places. However, after a couple 
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of interviews, I realised that taking interview in their places was not always 
helpful as they often busy with many works and talking for a long duration, 
hence became difficult. Therefore, I invited those two couples in two different 
times and learned about their experiences. On that stage, I learned about many 
dynamics of marginalisation. Next, I went to Mirza’s house. Later we took a 
walk and he took me to the places where he feels attached. He asked me to 
visit a Moroccan mosque. There he discussed his solidarity with other Muslims. 
Shafiq is an owner of a shop where I used to go to buy Fish. My regular trip to 
his shop helped me building good relationship with Shafiq as well as other 
Bangladeshi customers. It was his place where I met with Iqbal. I took 
interview of Shafiq at his shop. I stayed there and observed the activity. I 
found that it was mostly migrant people who visited his shop most of the time. 
At one incident, a brown-skinned man questioned Shafiq whether he is from 
Suriname? He replied negatively with an uncomfortable look. Later he shared 
his negative perception of Surinamese men with me. I visited regularly in his 
shop even after my interview. This place helped me to understand social 
position of Bangladeshi migrant and other groups, which I may not capture if 
only relied on the interview. Meeting with Newaz and Rohmat were relatively 
short. I met with them two times as getting time from them was difficult. In 
the case of Atiqur, I sent an email to him and asked for the interview. Taking 
the interview with him was different from other conducted interviews, as he 
possessed different social class. However, he went to the question of 
marginalisation quickly than other participants. He explained his position of 
being a teacher but a non-white person in a country where race does play an 
important role.  
I used recorder to record my interview conversation however, I always 
took their consent. Respondents had the right to get away and stop at any 
point. Shafiq, for example, did not feel comfortable with the recorder. 
Therefore, I took notes in his case. I made transcripts of those interviews, 
which I later used to analyse the findings.  
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Appendix II: Map of the Research Location - The Hague 
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Appendix III: Interview Guideline 
 
 
 
Research sub-questions Related questionnaire 
1) What is the specific socio-
political context in the 
Netherlands that are impli-
cated in the social location 
for Bangladeshi allochtonen 
men? 
 
1. How long do you live in the Netherlands?  
Do you see any difference in the way Dutch 
people relate to foreigners now and when 
you arrived in the Netherlands? If yes, tell 
me a story related that. 
 
2. Have you or the members of your family 
ever experienced an unpleasant situation in 
public space (street, restaurant, school) be-
cause you are foreigners? Tell me about it. 
 
2) How this context impacts 
Bangladeshi community, es-
pecially Bangladeshi 
allochtonen men’s social loca-
tion vis-à-vis other migrants 
in Dutch society? 
1. Where are you working and how did you get 
that job? 
 
2. What problems Bangladeshi people face in 
their workplace?  Did you face any of those? 
Tell me something about those? 
 
3. Do other foreigners face similar problems?  
 
4. Do you work with Dutch people or with 
other foreigners or with both? Do you no-
tice any difference in working with Dutch or 
with foreigners?  
 
3) What are the experiences and 
life strategies Bangladeshi 
men take to deal with their 
marginalised manhood in 
their family as well as in the 
Bangladeshi community in 
relation to other Muslim 
migrants and white Dutch 
men? 
1. Do you think that the life style of your family 
is different than the life style of white Dutch 
family? If yes, what do you see as main 
differences?  
 
2. Does your wife work outside the home? (for 
men) 
 
3. Do you make important decisions for your 
family together with your wife, or mainly on 
your own? 
 
4. There is much discussion about women’s 
rights and gay rights in the Netherlands. 
What do you think about it? 
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5. Do you have daughter/s? If yes,  
i) Do you think her life is better here than 
in Bangladesh? Why is that? (If yes 
why and if no why) 
 
ii) What do you think if your daughter 
wants to marry a Dutch Christian 
man? 
iii) What do you think if your daughter 
wants to marry a Turkish or Moroc-
can man? 
 
6. Do you have any son/s if yes? 
i) What do you think if your son wants to 
marry a Dutch Christian woman? 
ii) What do you think if your son wants to 
marry a Turkish or Moroccan wom-
an? 
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